Citigroup Inc. – Say on Pay
RESOLVED
The stockholders of Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”) request the board of directors to adopt a policy that provides shareholders the opportunity at each annual shareholder meeting to vote on an advisory resolution, proposed by management, to ratify the compensation of the named executive officers (“NEOs”) set forth in the proxy statement’s Summary Compensation Table (the “SCT”) and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the SCT (but not the Compensation Discussion and Analysis). The proposal submitted to stockholders should make clear that the vote is non-binding and would not affect any compensation paid or awarded to any NEO.
SUPPORTING STATEMENT
In our view, senior executive compensation at Citigroup has not always been structured in ways that best serve stockholders’ interests. For example, while shareholders were experiencing negative total shareholder return for 2007, former Chairman and CEO Charles Prince received more than $15 million in reported total compensation.
We believe that existing U.S. corporate governance arrangements, including SEC rules and stock exchange listing standards, do not provide shareholders with sufficient mechanisms for providing input to boards on senior executive compensation. In contrast to U.S. practice, in the United Kingdom, public companies allow shareholders to cast an advisory vote on the “directors’ remuneration report,” which discloses executive compensation. Such a vote isn’t binding, but gives shareholders a clear voice that could help shape senior executive compensation. A recent study of executive compensation in the U.K. before and after the adoption of the shareholder advisory vote there found that CEO cash and total compensation became more sensitive to negative operating performance after the vote’s adoption. (Sudhakar Balachandran et al., “Solving the Executive Compensation Problem through Shareholder Votes? Evidence from the U.K.” (Oct. 2007).)
Currently U.S. stock exchange listing standards require shareholder approval of equity-based compensation plans; those plans, however, set general parameters and accord the compensation committee substantial discretion in making awards and establishing performance thresholds for a particular year. Shareholders do not have any mechanism for providing ongoing feedback on the application of those general standards to individual pay packages.
Similarly, performance criteria submitted for shareholder approval to allow a company to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million are broad and do not constrain compensation committees in setting performance targets for particular senior executives. Withholding votes from compensation committee members who are standing for reelection is a blunt and insufficient instrument for registering dissatisfaction with the way in which the committee has administered compensation plans and policies in the previous year.
Accordingly, we urge Citigroup’s board to allow stockholders to express their opinion about senior executive compensation by establishing an annual referendum process. The results of such a vote could provide Citigroup with useful information about stockholders’ views on the company’s senior executive compensation, as reported each year, and would facilitate constructive dialogue between stockholders and the board.
We urge stockholders to vote for this proposal.
Shareholder Proposal on Sudan Presented at JP Morgan Chase Stockholder Meeting
Statement at JP Morgan Chase Stockholder Meeting in Support of
Resolution No. 10 Concerning Human Rights Policies
May 20, 2008
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Board of Directors & my fellow shareholders. I am presenting this proposal on behalf of Trillium Asset Management Corporation, the Calvert Group, Amnesty International and the General Board of Pensions and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church. [The proposal received 7.5% support from fellow shareholders.]
Resolution No. 10 calls for a report to shareowners discussing how our investment policies address or could address human rights issues, with a view toward adding appropriate policies and procedures to apply when a company in which we are invested is identified as contributing to human rights violations through their businesses or operations in a country with a clear pattern of mass atrocities or genocide.
As you know, the massacres perpetuated in Darfur by the Sudanese government – which the current Administration has labeled a genocide — were the catalyst for this proposal. Since February 2003, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed by both deliberate and indiscriminate attacks, and 2.5 million civilians in the region have been displaced.
Much of the revenue fueling this conflict is generated by Sudan’s oil industry. With little capital or expertise to efficiently extract its own oil, Sudan relies almost entirely on foreign companies for both. The oil industry in Sudan is dominated by four foreign companies: China National Petroleum Corporation, Petronas of Malaysia, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India, and Sinopec of China.
In 2007, working with organizations that have expertise on the conflict in Sudan, we and other investors began to approach companies in our portfolio with known relationships to these four oil companies. Our request to JP Morgan Chase and other prominent Wall Street firms is that you engage with these companies. Use any influence you have to encourage them to press the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. It will mean something to these companies to hear you, as one of their investors and a potential or actual investment banking services provider.
Many of their responses we’ve received from companies we’ve engaged is encouraging. Morgan Stanley has written to companies of concern to express their clients’ concern about Darfur, and empowered its internal “franchise committee” to consider human rights matters when reviewing deals. Citigroup has stated its support for UN Security Council Resolution 1769 calling for the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Merrill Lynch and T. Rowe Price have agreed to review human rights organizations’ corporate profiles in their research processes, and Merrill will consider offering Sudan-free investment products.
JP Morgan Chase has taken this proposal very seriously. We are grateful for the careful attention and consideration that it has been given, and we have been assured that our dialogue with senior management will continue beyond today. Because of the urgency of the crisis in Sudan, however, it is deeply disappointing that JPMC has not taken any measure comparable to those of other firms. Your new statement on human rights is extremely vague in terms of providing guidance on how this company will respond to the situation in Sudan and others like it. In our discussions, we will encourage you to take leadership by sending a clear signal to the global community that JP Morgan Chase will not finance or profit from, directly or indirectly, business activities that violate human rights in the Sudan or elsewhere. Accordingly, we call on shareholders present here today to vote their shares in favor of this proposal, as a strong signal to management that a strong policy is warranted.
Report on How Investment Policies Address Human Rights Issues – JPMorgan Chase & Co.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND OUR INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO
WHEREAS
The issue of Human Rights increasingly impacts investors and companies alike. Company reputations are affected by both direct and indirect involvement in human rights violations. Operating in countries with clear patterns of these violations, such as Sudan and Burma, may heighten reputational and financial risk. Furthermore, companies can face similar risks when they or their suppliers are found to be using forced labor, discriminating against employees, or committing other such abuses.
Proponents believe that institutional investors, including asset management firms such as JPMorgan Chase & Co., bear fiduciary and moral responsibilities as owners of stock in companies that may be connected to human rights violations. Thus we are encouraging the Corporation to report on policies and guidelines that address these issues. This report and guidelines can address how the Corporation as a shareholder can most effectively respond to these human rights issues, including strategies for shareowner engagement with the companies and/or divestment of such stock as appropriate.
RESOLVED
Shareowners request that the Board of Directors authorize and prepare a report to shareowners which discusses how our investment policies address or could address human rights issues, at reasonable cost and excluding proprietary information, by October 2008.
Such a report should review the current investment policies of the Corporation with a view toward adding appropriate policies and procedures to apply when a company in which we are invested, or its subsidiaries or affiliates, is identified as contributing to human rights violations through their businesses or operations in a country with a clear pattern of mass atrocities or genocide.
Supporting Statement
Proponents believe one example, clearly demonstrating the need for this report, concerns the ongoing atrocities in Sudan, and how certain types of foreign investment contribute to the conflict.
Sudan’s western region, Darfur, continues to experience human rights abuses on an unimaginable scale, including systematic and widespread murder, torture, rape, abduction, looting and forced displacement. Since February 2003, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed by both deliberate and indiscriminate attacks, and 2.5 million civilians in the region have been displaced.
Much of the revenue fueling this conflict is generated by Sudan’s oil industry. Rather than funding social development, the majority of the revenue is funneled into military expenditures.
With little capital or expertise to efficiently extract its own oil, Sudan relies almost entirely on foreign companies for both. The oil industry in Sudan is dominated by four foreign companies: China National Petroleum Corporation, Petronas of Malaysia, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India, and Sinopec of China.
Over 20 US states and 50 colleges have adopted Sudan investment policies, including engagement, screening and divestment, regarding these and other foreign companies operating in certain sectors in Sudan. A 1997 presidential executive order generally bars American companies and citizens from conducting business in Sudan. In 2007, President Bush reinforced that executive order.
Proponents believe that JPMorgan Chase & Co., as an investor, has a responsibility to address this internationally condemned conflict in the Sudan.
Citigroup Inc. – Say on Pay
RESOLVED
The stockholders of Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”) request the board of directors to adopt a policy that provides shareholders the opportunity at each annual shareholder meeting to vote on an advisory resolution, proposed by management, to ratify the compensation of the named executive officers (“NEOs”) set forth in the proxy statement’s Summary Compensation Table (the “SCT”) and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the SCT (but not the Compensation Discussion and Analysis). The proposal submitted to stockholders should make clear that the vote is non-binding and would not affect any compensation paid or awarded to any NEO.
SUPPORTING STATEMENT
In our view, senior executive compensation at Citigroup has not always been structured in ways that best serve stockholders’ interests. For example, in 2006 all five named executive officers were paid more than $78 million in total compensation. Additionally, Robert Rubin’s previous contract guaranteed him a bonus for the years 1999 to 2005.
We believe that existing U.S. corporate governance arrangements, including SEC rules and stock exchange listing standards, do not provide shareholders with sufficient mechanisms for providing input to boards on senior executive compensation. In contrast to U.S. practice, in the United Kingdom, public companies allow shareholders to cast an advisory vote on the “directors’ remuneration report,” which discloses executive compensation. Such a vote isn’t binding, but gives shareholders a clear voice that could help shape senior executive compensation. A recent study of executive compensation in the U.K. before and after the adoption of the shareholder advisory vote there found that CEO cash and total compensation became more sensitive to negative operating performance after the vote’s adoption. (Sudhakar Balachandran et al., “Solving the Executive Compensation Problem through Shareholder Votes? Evidence from the U.K.” (Oct. 2007.)
Currently U.S. stock exchange listing standards require shareholder approval of equity-based compensation plans; those plans, however, set general parameters and accord the compensation committee substantial discretion in making awards and establishing performance thresholds for a particular year. Shareholders do not have any mechanism for providing ongoing feedback on the application of those general standards to individual pay packages.
Similarly, performance criteria submitted for shareholder approval to allow a company to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million are broad and do not constrain compensation committees in setting performance targets for particular senior executives. Withholding votes from compensation committee members who are standing for reelection is a blunt and insufficient instrument for registering dissatisfaction with the way in which the committee has administered compensation plans and policies in the previous year.
Accordingly, we urge Citigroup’s board to allow stockholders to express their opinion about senior executive compensation by establishing an annual referendum process. The results of such a vote could provide Citigroup with useful information about stockholders’ views on the company’s senior executive compensation, as reported each year, and would facilitate constructive dialogue between stockholders and the board.
We urge stockholders to vote for this proposal.
